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BIAS, SUBJECTIVITY, AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Katherine Judson
I’m Kate Judson, and I teach at the University of Wisconsin in the
Law School. I’ve been asked to summarize the science for the law-
yers in the room, which I have been told is a hopeless cause, but I’m
a Cubs fan and I do wrongful convictions work, so I am comfortable
with hopeless causes and I feel I’m up to the challenge. I’m confi-
dent that lawyers can learn science, maybe even before the Cubs
win the World Series.
I want to talk about bias, subjectivity and wrongful convictions. In
law, we apply lessons from the past to contemporary problems.
When we look at a wrongful conviction after exoneration, we get to
look back at what might have caused it. This is valuable because we
learn lessons we can then apply to prevent future miscarriages of
justice. Today I’d like to discuss a little about what we know from
past exonerations and some of the factors that can contribute to
wrongful convictions. What’s great about this is that a lot of these
factors have been ably analyzed by everybody who’s been up here
before me, so I’m really grateful for that. Thank you.
Examining wrongful convictions that were later overturned with
new DNA evidence allows us to identify six factors that significantly
contribute to wrongful convictions.1 The influence of these factors
may be slightly different percentagewise for DNA versus non-DNA
cases, but they are significant in both contexts. Wrongful convic-
tions often occur as a result of incentivized testimony from
witnesses, like jailhouse informant or “snitch” testimony, false con-
fessions, eyewitness identification error, bad lawyering, government
misconduct and faulty forensic science.2 The one I’m going to focus
on today is faulty forensic science.
Faulty forensic science may mean a couple of different things.
First, there is unverified or unvalidated forensic science, science
that doesn’t have a reliable evidence base. Then, there are misstate-
ments of forensic science: misstatements about probability,
misstatements about what the evidence actually shows, and misstate-
ments about reliability. And then there is actual misconduct or
fraud by experts or lab analysts, which, though alarming, happens
1. BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES
WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 361 (2001).
2. Id.
779
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less frequently. It makes lots of headlines when it happens,3 but
does not appear to happen very frequently.
More often what we’re dealing with when we deal with faulty fo-
rensic science are issues of bias and issues of improper testimony.
About sixty percent of wrongful convictions that used forensic sci-
ence involve improper testimony.4 After a comprehensive review of
hair comparison analysis cases following a series of high-profile ex-
onerations, a joint press release issued by the FBI, the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), and the Inno-
cence Project acknowledged that FBI testimony on microscopic
hair analysis contained testimonial errors in more than ninety per-
cent of cases in an ongoing review—analysts misstated what the
evidence actually showed and testified with more certainty than the
evidence warranted.5
Often the problems lie with a lack of underlying research.6 Many
have recognized the difficulty and potential for missteps when fo-
rensic science disciplines are developed to aid prosecutors in the
courtroom, rather than based firmly in hard science.7 The Daubert
case itself explicitly recognizes that “there are important differences
between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for
truth in the laboratory.”8 In the absence of adequate data, there is
more room for subjectivity, and therefore bias, to creep into the
process. In science-dependent child abuse cases, the underlying re-
search is often inadequate or fraught with error.9 This creates a
climate that can lead to wrongful conviction.
It is particularly important to consider how much subjectivity is
involved in child abuse cases because many child abuse cases are
science-dependent, meaning that the entire case rests upon expert
opinion (in some cases, science is used to show both the actus reus
and the mens rea, sometimes in the absence of any other evidence),
3. Id. at 138.
4. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009).
5. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Testimony on Microscopic Hair
Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in Ongoing Review (April 20,
2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-
analysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review.
6. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PATH FORWARD 187 (2009) (“[T]he forensic science disciplines suffer from an inadequate
research base.”).
7. Id.
8. Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 at 596–97 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2014-11-2 B 3438-12 (Swed.),
http://rffr.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Swedish_supreme_court_20141016.pdf (dis-
cussing the limitations of research tracing the reasons of a child’s injury to violent shaking by
adult).
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rather than science-reliant, where forensic science helps elucidate a
particular part of the case (identity of the perpetrator, for exam-
ple). Just because a case involves faulty forensic science, whether
the case is science-dependent or science-reliant, does not mean that
the defendant is innocent. If the importance of the science goes up,
however, so does the risk of wrongful conviction. If a conviction
rests entirely, or nearly so, on unvalidated, misleading, or improper
forensic science, it is of particular concern. When a field of forensic
science is without safeguards for validity and reliability, expert wit-
ness testimony should either be kept from the jury (as in successful
Daubert challenges) or, if the jury will hear it, the witnesses must
make the shortcomings in the data absolutely clear. In wrongful
convictions, however, we often see unreliable methods or data and
then a witness who testifies with more certainty than the science
warrants.10
Proponents of the Shaken Baby Syndrome/Abusive Head
Trauma hypothesis address this flaw in the research by claiming
that in the absence of high quality research, it is appropriate to rely
on clinical judgment.11 In other words, the training and experience
of the physician is what comes into the equation when the research
is poor or lacking. That’s really problematic because it introduces
the subjectivity that infects the other forensic sciences.
Some of this is likely due to bias. Bias is a significant and often
unrecognized problem in science-dependent cases. One of the
things that we always need to address when we talk about bias, as
Professor Maddox and Professor Sommers pointed out, is that no
one is immune. There is nothing about law or medical school that
makes a person immune to bias. Having bias doesn’t make you a
bad person, it makes you a person. We all have implicit bias. We
can’t keep ourselves from having it; it is, by definition, uninten-
tional. What’s important is to recognize it and try to minimize its
effects.
Bias, far from being absent among physicians and experts, has
been seen and studied in the medical care context. The National
Academies Press have a publication called Unequal Treatment: Con-
fronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare.12 Data from this
10. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 4, at 14.
11. See Sandeep Narang, A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syn-
drome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 505, 532 (2011) (discussing that well-established
medical diagnoses such as migraine headaches have no randomized controlled trials).
12. See generally INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2003) (reporting findings assessing the extent and source of
racial and ethnic differences in the quality of health care received by patients not attributable
to known factors such as access to care, ability to pay, or insurance coverage).
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study suggests that different medical care is provided or prescribed
to different groups. Race and gender can affect all aspects of
healthcare, including what medications and procedures doctors
prescribe. There is evidence suggesting that even wait times differ
based on the racial or ethnic group of the patient.13
Further complicating this issue is the fact that clinical judgment
in the child abuse context is different from clinical judgment in the
treatment context. Relying on “clinical judgment” creates a number
of problems, including a Daubert issue. “Clinical judgment” often
means merely the say-so of the treating physician. Another term for
the mere say-so of an expert witness is, of course, ipse dixit, which
the Daubert decision prohibits. Legal scholar D. Michael Risinger
notes that “in circumstances when experience alone does not re-
solve the main doubts about reliability, it would be irrational and
therefore an abuse of discretion to rely upon it.”14
Confirmation bias, or the tendency to seek out confirmatory in-
formation once a hypothesis is developed, frequently comes into
play in medical decision-making. Confirmation bias may mean seek-
ing confirmatory evidence, rather than disconfirming evidence. It
also can affect the tendency to recall evidence. Confirmation bias
may cause a person to recall confirming evidence in a biased man-
ner. It can also cause people to interpret ambiguous evidence in a
manner that conforms to their existing beliefs. When clear guide-
lines and unambiguous testing exist, confirmation bias plays a
smaller role in medical diagnosis, though no one is free from it.
When those standards are absent, however, confirmation bias may
have a greater effect on outcomes.
Confirmation bias in police investigation has been studied. Po-
lice officers often rate discomfirming or exonerating evidence as
less reliable or credible, and prefer guilt confirming evidence that
supports their initial hypotheses.15 This is another example of sub-
jectivity or uncertainty in the process allowing bias to come in.
Bias can be a factor in any criminal case, but it’s a particular
problem in science-dependent child abuse cases. The lack of objec-
tive tests, standard diagnostic criteria, and strong evidence base
13. Kristin N. Ray et al., Disparities in Time Spent Seeking Medical Care in the United States,
175 JAMA INTERN. MED. 1983, 1984 (2015).
14. D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 776 (2000).
15. Karl Ask & Par Anders Granhag, Motivational Bias in Criminal Investigators’ Judgments
of Witness Reliability, 37 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 579–80 (2007); Karl Ask, Anna Rebelius
& Par Anders Granhag, The “Elasticity” of Criminal Evidence: A Moderator of Investigator Bias, 22
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1245, 1253–55 (2008).
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conspire to ask doctors, police officers and lawyers to make subjec-
tive judgments that are crucial to the outcome of the case. We
heard earlier today that bias might sneak into the process when
someone has too great a workload or when a person feels stressed
or threatened. I’m sure that everybody in here who’s been in court,
either as a lawyer or an expert witness, has had that feeling. People
tend to fall back on their assumptions—engage in thought that is
comfortable for them—under these circumstances.
Investigators also show marked confirmation bias when they’re
asked to form a hypothesis of guilt early in the evaluation of evi-
dence.16 Witnesses often claim that they weren’t biased or didn’t
rush to judgment but, of course, people can’t will away bias or nec-
essarily stop the rush to judgment.
One of the things we see a lot in science-dependent child abuse
cases is a bias in the medical history and in the taking of the medi-
cal history. You might hear something like “inconsistent history,”
where the history doesn’t match the expectations of injury. This is
significant especially if the only history given is history of a fall. You
might have a caregiver who says the child fell, but the physician
says, “These injuries can’t have happened from this kind of a fall.”
Why? “Because every time I see it, I diagnose abuse.” And that’s
where circularity enters into that process.
For example, the Wisconsin Innocence Project is handling a case
in which a physician claimed a decedent’s injuries could not have
resulted from a fall, even when a witness reported a fall from a
chair.17 Because the medical experts had a preconceived notion
that the decedent’s injuries were inconsistent with a fall, doctors
testified at trial that the fall either did not occur or could not have
been fatal. This is an example of history that falls victim to bias.
Rather than examine assumptions about what kinds of injuries
could be expected from a fall (and that while rare, fatal falls from
furniture occur) and fully consider the history given (a witnessed
fall), expert witnesses instead testified that a collection of medical
findings was always the result of abuse.
It’s fair to point out that in a child abuse case, the history may
not always be correct. A caregiver could misremember an incident
or be unclear. An investigator could misremember or misrecord
what the caregiver said. A physician could receive evidence second-
or third-hand from caregivers and investigators, and portions of it
could be incorrect by the time it gets to them. The history given by
16. Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and Counteract
Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 315, 328 (2009).
17. People v. Bailey, 47 Misc.3d 355, 360 (Monroe Cty. Ct. 2014).
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the caregiver could be a lie, that is to say, the person could have
made up a story or abused the child and lied about it. But the his-
tory could also be true and exonerating. Sometimes when someone
says they don’t know what happened, they really don’t know what
happened. And the reason that they’re at the doctor’s office or at
the hospital is to get help in figuring out what occurred. So just
from the injuries alone, and just from the statements alone, it’s
often impossible to tell whether what you have is a true or a false
statement.
Something that always needs to be addressed in a criminal inves-
tigation is tunnel vision. Tunnel vision is the “‘compendium of
common heuristics and logical fallacies’ to which we are all suscep-
tible, that lead actors in the criminal justice system to ‘focus on a
suspect, select and filter the evidence that will build a case for con-
viction while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away
from guilt.’”18 Tunnel vision bias is in play to some degree in many,
if not most, wrongful convictions. Tunnel vision may occur when
investigators home in on one suspect rather than others, or, in
child abuse prosecutions, where investigators and experts focus on
one cause of a child’s injuries, ignoring other possibilities. We can
all think of an example of this. We can’t always avoid it, but we can
try to be aware of it.
Bias is exacerbated by factors in the system, including role ef-
fects. People’s perceptions of their role can influence their
decisions.19 This is one of the risks of embedding forensic science
within a law enforcement agency. If an analyst sees his or her role as
being a part of a police department and to catch criminals, that
role effect might have an impact on their decision making.20 This
18. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Crimi-
nal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292 (2006) (citing Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from
the “Laboratory” of Wrongful convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evi-
dence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847, 848 (2002)).
19. See generally James W. Pichert & Richard C. Anderson, Taking Different Perspectives on a
Story, 69 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 309 (1977) (finding that an idea’s significance in terms of a given
perspective determined whether an idea would be learned and recalled a week later); Rich-
ard C. Anderson, James W. Pichert & Larry L. Shirey, Effects of the Reader’s Schema at Different
Points in Time, 75 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 271 (1983) (finding that perspectives assigned before,
shortly after, and long after reading all had substantial effects on recalling a story); D.
Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science:
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2002) (revealing the extent
to which reliability is undermined depends on observer effects, the characteristics of the
expertise at issue, especially the degree to which it depends on subjective human judgment).
20. Risinger et al., supra note 19, at 18 (quoting James E. Starrs, The Ethical Obligations of
the Forensic Scientist in the Criminal Justice System, 54 J. ASS’N OFFICIAL ANALYTICAL CHEMISTS 906,
910 (1971) for the proposition, “It is quite common to find . . . laboratory facilities and
personnel who are, for all intents and purposes, an arm of the prosecution. They analyze
material submitted, on all but rare occasions, solely by the prosecution. They testify almost
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arguably can also be a problem of creating child abuse investigation
teams. We’ve heard a lot of conflicting information today about
child abuse investigation teams. They can work, they can not work.
A frank discussion of role effects isn’t really to say whether these
things are good or bad; it’s really more to recognize that when you
create a group of people who have a particular role and who see
their role in a certain way, that does open them up to the possibility
of bias.
Then there are conformity effects: the tendency to conform to
the perceptions, beliefs, and behavior of others.21 This is really sig-
nificant and something that we see an awful lot of the time in child
abuse cases because, again, emotions run very, very high. People
have strong opinions and they come down hard on one side or the
other. I want to give one very brief example of conformity pressure.
So after testifying as a defense expert for parents accused of abuse,
an expert received an email from a colleague. The colleague wrote,
“You are deluded at best and criminal at the worst since you are
aiding and abetting in the crime, after the fact to be sure, but nev-
ertheless actively supporting this type of deviant behavior.”22
This isn’t to call somebody out about writing a mean email. But
it’s to understand that incredible pressure can be brought to bear
on individuals who do not conform. That allows bias into the equa-
tion. It can affect the person’s judgment in the future, and it can
affect the person’s willingness to stand up for a patient or for them-
selves, when they have a different opinion from the rest of the
group. It also shows what can happen when a professional does not
recognize the importance of feedback from downstream. Here, the
physician who testified for the government had an opportunity to
revisit his diagnosis in light of what he learned from experts for the
other side. Instead, he took the opportunity to insult those experts.
Which brings us to groupthink. Working together, having an
identity as part of a group, can undermine the ability to catch er-
rors or reveal alternatives. A really classic example that happens in
the medical context is the resident disagrees with her attending,
but is afraid to say anything because the attending is the teacher,
the attending is the boss.
exclusively on behalf of the prosecution. They inevitably become part of the effort to bring
an offender to justice. And as a result, their impartiality is replaced by a viewpoint colored
brightly with prosecutorial bias”).
21. Id. (revealing the extent to which reliability is undermined depends on observer
effects, the characteristics of the expertise at issue, especially the degree to which it depends
on subjective human judgment).
22. E-mail from Stephen Done, MD, to Julie Mack, MD (Dec. 5, 2014) (on file with
author).
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This is just an example of this occurring in a child abuse case
from a transcript. “Q: And had anyone made a determination at
this time what the cause or potential causes of the injuries were?”
“A: It would be unfair if I didn’t say that everybody who had seen
her felt very strongly that this was likely to be abuse.”23
Some people can do this, and some people have difficulty with it.
But if you’re the lone voice in a group of five or six or seven or
eight or nine people who doesn’t agree, it might be difficult to ar-
ticulate your concerns, it might be difficult to stick up for yourself if
you’re attacked, and it might be difficult to verbalize what you think
is going on.
Diagnosis momentum is a particular type of cognitive bias in
medical diagnosis. It can be experienced by a doctor on his or her
own, but it also goes hand in hand with the challenges of working
in groups. Dr. Jerome Groopman addresses the problem in his
book How Doctors Think.24 Once a particular diagnosis becomes
fixed in a physician’s mind, despite incomplete evidence or discrep-
ancies in evidence, the first doctor passes on this diagnosis to his
peers or subordinates. He compares it to a boulder rolling down a
mountain gaining enough force to crush anything in its way.25 We
know that error in medical diagnosis is an enormous problem: the
Journal of the American Medical Association has published articles
showing that cases of delayed, missed, and incorrect diagnoses are
common, with an incidence range of about ten to twenty percent.26
This represents an average; certainly some diagnoses are more diffi-
cult to make than others. If a condition can be diagnosed with a test
that is easy to perform and frequently accurate, the error rate might
be lower, and when diagnoses are ambiguous, without standardized
diagnostic criteria or gold standard tests, the rate might be higher.
Error is higher with respect to clinical diagnoses, and lower with
respect to diagnostic tests.27 In the child abuse context, what that
means is that you can expect the error rate to be higher when a
diagnosis is something like, this was or was not abuse, and lower
with respect looking at, for example, a CAT scan and identifying a
23. Transcript of Record at 117, State v. Morris, (WA) (transcript on file with author).
24. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 128 (2007).
25. Id. (“Diagnosis momentum, like a boulder rolling down a mountain, gains enough
force to crush anything in its way.”).
26. E.g. Mark L. Graber, Robert M. Wachter & Christine K. Cassel, Bringing Diagnosis into
the Quality and Safety Equations, 308 JAMA 1211, 1211 (2012).
27. See id.; but see Eta S. Berner & Mark L. Graber, Overconfidence as a Cause of Diagnostic
Error in Medicine, 121 AM. J. MED. S2, S6 (2008) (noting that “it is clear that an extensive and
ever-growing literature confirms that diagnostic errors exist at nontrivial and sometimes
alarming rates [and that] [t]hese studies span every specialty and virtually every dimension of
both inpatient and outpatient care”).
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fracture, or looking at an x-ray and identifying a fracture, or look-
ing at an MRI and identifying a subdural hematoma. So the
diagnostic testing portion tends to be somewhat more accurate
than actually coming to the clinical diagnosis. That should make
sense. Because any time we have to synthesize data, there’s a lot
more room for error than when we’re looking at a lab result with-
out interpreting it.
It’s also clear that over-confidence and other cognitive biases
have a role to play in misdiagnosis. Cognitive errors are defined in
this context as reflecting problems gathering data, failing to elicit
accurate information from the patient.28 So there is failure in his-
tory-taking, failure to recognize the significance of the data—like
misinterpreting test results. But the most common is really the fail-
ure to synthesize or put it all together. What that means in a child
abuse context is that physicians are generally fairly accurate at iden-
tifying particular medical conditions, identifying a broken bone,
identifying a bruise, identifying a bleed. But asking doctors to con-
sider causation requires them to engage in a more speculative
enterprise.
When Berner and Graber discuss misdiagnosis and over-confi-
dence, they focus in particular on faulty heuristics and premature
closure.29 Premature closure is very important in this context. It’s
narrowing the choice of diagnostic hypotheses too early in the pro-
cess.30 It’s a very, very common mistake and it happens really
frequently. So like the example I gave before from the transcript
where the physician said, “Q: Had anyone made a determination at
this time what the cause or potential causes of the injuries were?”
“A: It would be unfair if I didn’t say that everybody who had seen
her felt very strongly that this was likely to be abuse.”31 That’s a
really great example of premature closure.
Another type of bias frequently seen in wrongful convictions is
context bias.32 Context bias is another thing that’s really tricky, be-
cause it can be useful, but it also can be misleading. Testimony in a
case might include claims from investigators or physicians that a
parent or caregiver delayed medical treatment to an injured child
because they took the child to a family member rather than imme-
diately to the emergency room, or chose to drive a child to the
hospital rather than waiting for an ambulance. While a delay in
28. Berner & Graber, supra note 27, at S7.
29. Id. at S8.
30. Id.
31. See Transcript of Record at 117, State v. Morris (WA), supra, note 23.
32. Berner & Graber, supra note 27, at S8.
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seeking care may be significant, it could also be a genuine misun-
derstanding of the seriousness of a child’s condition, or a genuine
belief that driving to the hospital would be faster than waiting for
an ambulance. Investigators might describe an accused person as
flat or unemotional after a child is seriously injured or dies, which
might lead to a conclusion that the person was uncaring or not par-
ticularly upset about the injured child. While that is one
explanation for a flat affect, shock or grief might also produce
numbness.
I once had an emergency room physician say to me, “Look, you
know, every time I give a family bad news, it goes differently. It’s
never the same.” Different people, even within the same family, can
have radically different reactions to the same bad news. Some might
cry when confronted with a tragic situation; others might become
angry, or even appear not to react at all. These reactions do not
necessarily give the investigator reliable evidence about how the
person feels about the loss of the decedent.
The other really important thing that we’re dealing with here is
the problem of inadequate feedback.33 Inadequate feedback is a
major obstacle to correcting diagnostic error. Feedback that is
delayed or absent may not be recognized for what it is and then the
perception that misdiagnosis is not a big problem remains unchal-
lenged. When there is an absence of information that the diagnosis
is wrong, the expert is allowed to assume it must be correct.34
We see this really frequently in the legal context when somebody
makes a diagnosis of abuse. When supporters of SBS/AHT have
been challenged by expert witnesses for the defense, they have at
times chosen to marginalize or attack the experts and pretend
there is no debate.35 Some attacks are extreme; after a high-profile
child abuse case was dismissed recently, a child abuse pediatrician
told the Boston Globe that physicians who assist defense attorneys
are “hired out as defense whores.”36
And that’s really an inability recognize the feedback that the le-
gal system is giving you, right? Juries will come to a conclusion
33. Id. at S10.
34. See id.
35. Peter J. Strouse, Editorial, Child Abuse: We Have Problems, 46 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY
587, 588 (2016); Thomas L. Slovis et al., Editorial, The Creation of Non-Disease: An Assault on the
Diagnosis of Child Abuse, 42 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 903 (2012).
36. Kevin Cullen, Nanny’s Case Could Have Broad Effects on Child Abuse Prosecutions, THE
BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/09/12/
nanny-case-could-have-broad-effects-child-abuse-prosecutions/doika7FUTM8W8wg0O84v7L/
story.html.
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that’s scientifically inappropriate. It’s a possibility and it’s some-
thing that certainly should be considered. But to summarily ignore
that when we have such an intersection of science and the law is a
serious problem.
Just a little bit more on the problem of absent feedback.37 Dr.
Schiff makes a really great point about how feedback on patient
response is critical for knowing not just how the patient is doing,
but also how we as clinicians are doing.38 And most doctors rely, at
least in part, on patient feedback to know whether their diagnoses
are correct. So you have a patient, and you think your patient has a
particular disorder. You give them medication, and it works. You
can be fairly confident that you diagnosed it correctly and you gave
them the right medication. It doesn’t work and you have to go back
to the drawing board. That kind of feedback is absent in most child
abuse cases.
Schiff also says that these refined signals from downstream re-
present an antidote to anchoring bias, which he describes as fixing
on a particular diagnosis, despite clues that such persistence is un-
warranted.39 And when that’s absent, you never get those clues. So
the feedback gap in medicine is especially pronounced in diagnosis
of child abuse. It’s an enormous problem there, and the physician
doesn’t get the kind of feedback that they need to refine their prac-
tice, making them unable to revise their thinking or improve their
skills to face the next challenge.
Any time you have subjectivity, it leaves room for bias. Without
explicit criteria for decision making, individuals will disambiguate
the situation using whatever information is most easily accessible
including all kinds of things, including stereotypes.
We’ve talked about the research objectives and challenges, but
it’s important to note that the circularity here that we’re talking
about really has a lot to do with these retrospective case studies
which depend on accurately sorting cases into abuse and non-abuse
categories that can be difficult and can be wrong. And so that
throws the entire finding into question. The methodological chal-
lenge here is the circularity challenge. When you’re trying to assess
the value of a diagnostic test or a diagnostic criteria, and you in-
clude as inclusion criteria the very critical findings that are being
studied, you can’t have confidence in the reliability of the result.
37. See generally Gordon D. Schiff, Minimizing Diagnostic Error: The Importance of Follow-up
and Feedback, 121 AM. J. MED. S38 (2008) (discussing an open-loop system in clinical diagno-
ses—or “nonfeedback controlled” system where one makes decisions based solely on
preprogrammed criteria and the preexisting model of the system).
38. Id. at S39.
39. Id. at S41.
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Some of the recent research recognizes this.40 Piteau says, “As
there are no standardized criteria for the definition of abuse, most
authors developed their own criteria, and many of these are fraught
with circular reasoning.”41 Again, that tells us what the limitations
of some of the best studies out there are. Diagnostic studies depend
on a constellation of clinical features because there is not a gold
standard diagnostic test. Any time there’s a lack of a test, a lack of
objective criteria, we allow bias to seep into the system. Maguire’s
research is in a similar vein and is significant because it acknowl-
edges the uncertainty of even the best data available.42
I want to touch a little bit on solutions. We’ve talked a lot about
the problems; I don’t have all the answers. But we have some ideas
about how we might prevent wrongful conviction in child abuse
cases. One is overcoming cognitive biases. And certainly those who
study psychology can address this better than I can. But one of the
things we want to talk about is bias awareness in education. You
need to know that you have bias. Bias is a thing we all need to know
that we carry around. Implicit bias is something that we have. But
just knowing about it doesn’t help, right? You can’t will it away.
And so there are a few things you can try to do. Asking individu-
als to consider and articulate their hypothesis’s opposite can
mitigate bias.43 Asking people to articulate reasons that counter
their own position can minimize the illusion of validity underlying
conformation bias.44 Discussing the evidence for and against their
hypothesis can reduce bias.45 Asking people to delay hypothesis for-
mation can reduce bias.46 None of these will solve the problem, but
they’re all important to think about.
Greater transparency is a big deal in this and other forensic sci-
ences and increasing transparency may lead to better outcomes. To
that end, increased electronic recording of interrogations and
other contacts between investigators and people suspected of
crimes may be warranted.47 Full discovery in criminal cases—where
40. Shalea J. Piteau et al., Clinical and Radiographic Characteristics Associated with Abusive
and Nonabusive Head Trauma: A Systematic Review, 130 PEDIATRICS 315, 321 (2012).
41. Id.
42. Sabine Ann Maguire et al., Estimating the Probability of Abusive Head Trauma: A Pooled
Analysis, 128 PEDIATRICS e550, e558 (2011) (noting that “[d]iagnostic studies in the field are
open to criticism of circularity because of their dependence on a constellation of clinical
features, as opposed to a single gold-standard diagnostic test, which does not exist”).
43. See Findley & Scott, supra note 18, at 382.
44. Id. at 388–89.
45. Id. at 388.
46. Id.
47. See David Oswald, Fred Sherratt & Simon Smith, Handling the Hawthorne Effect: The
Challenges Surrounding a Participant Observer, in REVIEW OF SOCIAL STUDIES: METHODOLOGICAL
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defense lawyers have access to open files—and increased collabora-
tion between the government and the defense also head in the
right direction. When decisions about prosecutions are made in
open and observable ways, investigators and prosecutors are more
able to resist biasing pressure.48
Proper investigation may help in these cases. And I think it
makes a big difference. But a lot of significant flaws will still exist.
These difficulties are exaggerated by an inadequate evidence base
and imprecise testing. Clearly, in innocence work, we have a sam-
pling bias; cases do not come to me unless there is powerful
evidence of innocence. For the most part, complete, objective inves-
tigations were not done in the cases my office accepts, though
incomplete investigations may have been complicated by poor lawy-
ering, misconduct, incorrect claims in testimony, or evidence
discovered after trial. Leigh Bishop, Chief of the Child Fatality Unit
at the Queens County District Attorney’s Office is going to talk
about one of her cases that included an exhaustive investigation,
after which no one was charged with a crime; I don’t see that in my
cases. Investigation can make a big difference, but it is not perfect.
It’s important to recognize that even a really good investigation is
not immune to bias. Even if all appropriate tests are performed
properly, even if physicians took unassailable histories, even if po-
lice investigated every alternate suspect, even if everyone involved
did everything correctly, there’s still a place for error to enter the
system.
Outcomes cannot be improved unless actors recognize that a
problem exists. Recognizing that wrongful convictions can and do
happen in child abuse cases, recognizing that there’s bias in the
literature, that there’s potential for error; these are all crucial parts
of improving outcomes. It’s particularly crucial for all actors in the
system to recognize that false negatives (failing to recognize abuse
when it is present) and false positives (concluding abuse when
abuse is not present) are equally unacceptable outcomes. Some ex-
perts have suggested that overdiagnosing abuse is preferable
because protection of children is paramount. But failing to prop-
erly diagnose a child is equally harmful and must be recognized as
such. Failing to make a proper diagnosis has serious and sometimes
irreparable consequences for children and families, which can in-
clude, but are not limited to, separation of children from loving
CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 55 (Latif Tas ed., 2014) (describing the Hawthorne Effect, in
which individuals change their behavior because they are aware they are being observed).
48. Findley & Scott, supra note 18, at 391.
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parents and serious medical consequences when children do not
receive proper treatment as the result of a misdiagnosis.
Even a criminal accusation that results in a dismissal or an acquit-
tal can destroy family relationships, can financially ruin a family,
and can be really significant and damaging in other ways.49 So one
way to improve outcomes might be to recognize false positives and
false negatives on the same footing, right on the same plane, miti-
gating bias.
What does not accomplish mitigating biases is to say, “I was not
biased.” Frequently, experts claim that they did not rush to judg-
ment or that they have no bias. Claiming not to have them does
nothing to mitigate the biases that every single person has. We want
to take lessons from other forensic sciences, because there are fo-
rensic sciences that can be tested or parts of them that can be
tested, and that we can learn lessons from. Then you want appropri-
ate adversarial testing of claims, not allowing false testimony to
come out in front of a jury.
There are a lot of similarities between child abuse investigation
and fire science investigation. For a long time, investigations of fires
relied on unsupported rules and hypotheses: if you saw certain fea-
tures of a fire, you could assume that it was caused by some sort of
incendiary means.50 Those have been shown to be false, as has any
idea of negative corpus—that if you rule out what you perceived to
be all possible accidental causes of the fire—that you could reliably
determine that the fire was arson.51 And those of us who’ve worked
on a lot of abuse cases can recognize that that’s often something
that happens. So this is from the NFPA report from 2009.52 They, in
their summary, found that many rules of thumb about fire causa-
tion typically assumed to indicate that an accelerant was used, like
“alligatoring” of wood, have been shown not to be true.53 You can
draw a nice parallel between these indicators of abuse that were
long thought to be exclusively diagnostic of abuse that are no
longer thought to be so.
49. Rachel Bluestain, Doctors Said They Shook Their Baby To Death. They Didn’t, DAILY BEAST
(Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/10/03/doctors-said-they-shook-
their-baby-to-death-they-didn-t.html.
50. See generally, Caitlin Plummer and Imran Syed, Shifted Science and Post-Conviction Relief,
8 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 259 (2012).
51. See NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION (NFPA), NFPA 921—GUIDE FOR FIRE
AND EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS § 19.6.5 (7th ed. 2014).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Then there’s this tidy parallel between negative corpus and with
the process of elimination in diagnosis. Negative corpus is the pro-
cess of determining the ignition source for a fire by eliminating all
suspected sources and then “claiming such methodology is proof of
an ignition source for which there is no evidence of its existence.”54
This was something that went on for a long time, but now the
NFPA, the National Fire Protection Association, calls the practice
unscientific.55 The NFPA’s 2014 manual says, “[Negative corpus] is
not consistent with the Scientific Method, is inappropriate, and
should not be used because it generates un-testable hypotheses, and
may result in incorrect determinations of the ignition source and
the first fuel ignited.”56 And then they say, “[I]t is improper to
opine a specific ignition source that has no evidence to support it,
even though all other hypothesized sources were eliminated.”57 Pro-
cess of elimination arguments rest on a number of assumptions.
The negative corpus example assumes that the investigator can cor-
rectly identify and rule out all other possible causes of a fire, that
the investigator will do all tests correctly, that there’s a negligible
error rate for each test, and then, perhaps most importantly, that all
of the possible sources of the fire are, in fact, on the investigator’s
list. Put another way, it does not meaningfully allow for the cause to
be “undetermined.”
This concern also applies in the child abuse context. Experts may
claim that abuse is a “rule-out” diagnosis, and that it can safely be
made once the physician has “ruled out” every other hypothesized
cause of the findings. Or they may answer in the affirmative ques-
tions like, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, were you
able to rule out all other potential causes for the injuries?”58 Those
statements are problematic in the same way that statements about
negative corpus are. And that’s where we can take the lessons from
other forensic sciences and apply them in this context.
The Wisconsin Innocence Project is leading a fundraising effort
for an independent scientific panel to review the evidence base for
SBS/AHT and other science-dependent child abuse prosecutions.
An independent review, conducted by impartial experts, is crucial
to getting it right. This effort, however, is ongoing and expected to
take some time. So in the meantime, what steps can we take?
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at § 18.6.5.
57. Id. at § 18.6.5.1.
58. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 764–65, People v. Calderaro, No. 1251-06 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. April 1, 2009) (transcript on file with author).
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We can start by recognizing the problem. We can recognize that
wrongful convictions exist, and that they can be ambiguous. But
some wrongful convictions have known, specific causes that can be
addressed. In science-dependent child abuse prosecutions, bias and
subjectivity can affect diagnosis decisions, which may in turn affect
prosecution decisions. We need to recognize that false negatives
and false positives are equally problematic. Children who are not
recognized as abused can continue to suffer abuse, sometimes esca-
lating abuse. This is tragic. It is equally tragic when an abuse
diagnosis is made incorrectly and families are separated wrongfully,
resulting in the suffering of all involved. Getting it right in these
cases requires a comprehensive and objective medical assessment. It
also requires more research and information to improve the diag-
nostic process. It requires changes in the process that mitigate bias.
Getting it right further requires responsible and accurate testi-
mony. When a proposition made in court is untestable or
unknowable, witnesses have an obligation to say so. Witnesses must
not testify with more certainty than the evidence supports, or specu-
late when research is lacking.
So given what we know now about the science behind SBS and
other kinds of child abuse, we know that medical findings often
associated with shaking are not pathognomonic of abuse;59 the
same is true of fractures, bruises and other medical findings.60
In order to combat known causes of wrongful conviction and en-
sure appropriate an accurate testimony in science-dependent
prosecutions, it is crucial to limit bias and subjectivity in the investi-
gation and prosecution of these cases to the extent possible.
59. See, e.g., Christian et al, Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Children, 123 PEDIATRICS
206 (2009).
60. See Glick et al., Physical Abuse of Children, 37 PEDIATRICS REV. 146 (2016).
